

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
STATESBORO DIVISION**

CHRISTOPHER LEE AMERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTY ALLEN; JOHNNY SIKES;  
TREVONZA BOBBITT; JOHN DOE;  
VALORIE PRIGEON; and HAROLD  
CARAVIELLO,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:18-cv-62

**ORDER AND MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff, who is currently housed at Smith State Prison in Glennville, Georgia, filed a cause of action, as supplemented, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of Georgia, contesting conditions of his confinement at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia. Docs. 1, 4. Since his initial Complaint, Plaintiff has made multiple other filings, including the submission of multiple exhibits, docs. 12, 14, two declarations, docs. 13, 17, a motion to produce names, doc. 15, two motions to amend his Complaint, docs. 22, 24, and a supplement to his Complaint, doc. 23. I **GRANT** Plaintiff's Motions to Amend, docs. 22, 24, and have considered Plaintiff's amendments and all exhibits offered in support of Plaintiff's Complaint while conducting the requisite frivolity review of Plaintiff's Complaint, as amended. For the reasons which follow, I **RECOMMEND** the Court **DISMISS without prejudice** Plaintiff's Complaint, **DIRECT** the Clerk of Court to **CLOSE** this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and **DENY**

Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* on appeal.<sup>1</sup> I **DENY** as moot Plaintiff's Motion to Produce Names, doc. 15.

## BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts multiple claims against multiple Defendants to challenge the conditions of his confinement. Doc. 1. Through his amended and supplemental Complaints, Plaintiff seeks to add factual allegations and to name additional individuals as Defendants in this cause of action. Docs. 22, 23, 24.

## STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action *in forma pauperis* under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets and shows an inability to pay the filing fee and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous, malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which

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<sup>1</sup> A “district court can only dismiss an action on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair. . . . To employ fair procedure, a district court must generally provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond.” Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation provides such notice and opportunity to respond. See Shivers v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 349, 262 F. App’x 121, 125, 127 (11th Cir. 2008) (indicating that a party has notice of a district court’s intent to *sua sponte* grant summary judgment where a magistrate judge issues a report recommending the *sua sponte* granting of summary judgment); Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting that report and recommendation served as notice that claims would be *sua sponte* dismissed). This Report and Recommendation constitutes fair notice to Plaintiff that his suit is due to be dismissed. As indicated below, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to present his objections to this finding, and the presiding district judge will review *de novo* properly submitted objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see also Glover v. Williams, No. 1:12-CV-3562, 2012 WL 5930633, at \*1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2012) (explaining that magistrate judge’s report and recommendation constituted adequate notice and petitioner’s opportunity to file objections provided a reasonable opportunity to respond). Additionally, Plaintiff has another opportunity to amend his Complaint to correct the deficiencies noted in this Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Should Plaintiff seek to amend his Complaint, he must file any desired amendment within 14 days from the date of this Report and Recommendation.

relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

When reviewing a complaint on an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the Court is guided by the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) “if it is ‘without arguable merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App’x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not” suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual

power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (“*Pro se* pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . . .” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003))). However, Plaintiff’s unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”).

## DISCUSSION

### I. Dismissal for Abuse of Judicial Process

The Complaint form directly asks Plaintiff whether he has “brought any lawsuits in federal court” “[w]hile incarcerated or detained in any facility[]” prior to his current filing. Doc. 1 at 2. This form directs a litigant to “describe [any] additional lawsuits on another piece of paper,” if he has filed “more than one lawsuit[.]” Id. Plaintiff disclosed two cases: Amerson v. Allen, No. 6:17-cv-156, 2018 WL 3543074, at \*1 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 26, 2017); and Amerson v. Hall, No. 5:07-cv-148, 2008 WL 594111, at \*1 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2008).<sup>2</sup> Doc. 1 at 2. Though Plaintiff has filed two motions to amend, docs. 22, 24, these motions do not disclose any

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<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff does not refer to the second listed case by name but states he filed a case in the Middle District of Georgia “[a]round 2006–2007[.]” Doc. 1 at 2. While the Court accepts this general statement as a disclosure, the fact remains Plaintiff filed other cases which he failed to disclose in his Complaint.

additional federal case filings or contain any information supplementing his initial statement regarding his previous filings.

A search of Plaintiff's litigation history, however, reveals that he has filed at least two other causes of action prior to executing his Complaint on June 8, 2018: (1) Amerson v. Sellers, No. 5:15-CV-8, 2015 WL 631994, at \*3 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 13, 2015); and (2) Amerson v. Unknown, 1:14-cv-03506 (N.D. Ga. 2014).

As previously stated, § 1915 requires a court to dismiss a prisoner's action if, at any time, the court determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Significantly, "[a] finding that the plaintiff engaged in bad faith litigiousness or manipulative tactics warrants dismissal" under § 1915. Redmon v. Lake Cty. Sheriff's Office, 414 F. App'x 221, 225 (11th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Attwood v. Singletary, 105 F.3d 610, 613 (11th Cir. 1997)). In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) permits a court to impose sanctions, including dismissal, for "knowingly fil[ing] a pleading that contains false contentions." Id. at 225–26 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)). Again, although *pro se* pleadings are to be construed liberally, "a plaintiff's *pro se* status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules." Id. at 226.

Relying on this authority, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has consistently upheld the dismissal of cases where a *pro se* prisoner plaintiff has failed to disclose his previous lawsuits, as required on the face of the § 1983 complaint form. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F. App'x at 226 (*pro se* prisoner's nondisclosure of prior litigation in § 1983 complaint amounted to abuse of judicial process resulting in sanction of dismissal); Shelton v. Rohrs, 406 F. App'x 340, 341 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Young v. Sec'y Fla. for Dep't of Corr., 380 F. App'x 939, 941 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); Hood v. Tompkins, 197 F. App'x 818, 819 (11th Cir. 2006) (same). Even

where the prisoner has later provided an explanation for his lack of candor, the Court has generally rejected the proffered reason as unpersuasive. See, e.g., Redmon, 414 F. App'x at 226 (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiff’s explanation for his failure to disclose the Colorado lawsuit—that he misunderstood the form—did not excuse the misrepresentation and that dismissal was a proper sanction.”); Shelton, 406 F. App'x at 341 (“Even if [the plaintiff] did not have access to his materials, he would have known that he filed multiple previous lawsuits.”); Young, 380 F. App'x at 941 (finding that not having documents concerning prior litigation and not being able to pay for copies of same did not absolve prisoner plaintiff “of the requirement of disclosing, at a minimum, all of the information that was known to him”); Hood, 197 F. App'x at 819 (“The objections were considered, but the district court was correct to conclude that to allow [the plaintiff] to then acknowledge what he should have disclosed earlier would serve to overlook his abuse of the judicial process.”).

Another district court in this Circuit has explained the importance of this information as follows:

[t]he inquiry concerning a prisoner’s prior lawsuits is not a matter of idle curiosity, nor is it an effort to raise meaningless obstacles to a prisoner’s access to the courts. Rather, the existence of prior litigation initiated by a prisoner is required in order for the Court to apply 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (the “three strikes rule” applicable to prisoners proceeding *in forma pauperis*). Additionally, it has been the Court’s experience that a significant number of prisoner filings raise claims or issues that have already been decided adversely to the prisoner in prior litigation. . . . Identification of prior litigation frequently enables the Court to dispose of successive cases without further expenditure of finite judicial resources.

Brown v. Saintavil, No. 2:14-CV-599, 2014 WL 5780180, at \*3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2014)

(emphasis omitted).

Plaintiff misrepresented his litigation history in his Complaint. The plain language of the Complaint form is clear, and Plaintiff failed to answer fully and truthfully.<sup>3</sup> Doc. 1 at 2. Notably, this is not the first time Plaintiff has made this mistake. This Court previously dismissed one of Plaintiff's actions for failure to disclose prior federal filings. See Amerson v. Allen, No. 6:17-cv-156, 2018 WL 3543074, at \*1 (S.D. Ga. July 23, 2018). This Court will not tolerate such lack of candor, and consequently, the Court should **DISMISS** this action, **without prejudice**, for Plaintiff's failure to truthfully disclose his full litigation history, as required.<sup>4</sup>

## II. Leave to Appeal *in Forma Pauperis*

The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal *in forma pauperis*.<sup>5</sup> Though Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not taken in good faith "before or after the notice of appeal is filed").

An appeal cannot be taken *in forma pauperis* if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. County of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal

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<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff, despite lengthy subsequent filings, makes no attempt to correct this error. Nothing in his subsequent exhibits, declarations, motions, amended complaints, or supplemental complaints, docs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, alters this conclusion.

<sup>4</sup> The Court notes that, in some cases, a dismissal without prejudice can be tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice. Jenkins v. Hutcheson, 708 F. App'x 647, 648 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018). However, it does not appear that Plaintiff's case presents such a situation.

<sup>5</sup> A certificate of appealability is not required in this § 1983 action.

theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). An *in forma pauperis* action is frivolous and not brought in good faith if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at \*1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff’s action, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should **DENY** Plaintiff *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

### CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I **GRANT** Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend, docs. 22, 24, and **DENY as moot** Plaintiff’s Motion to Produce Names, doc. 15. I **RECOMMEND** the Court **DISMISS without prejudice** Plaintiff’s Complaint, as amended, **DIRECT** the Clerk of Court to **CLOSE** this case and enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal, and **DENY** Plaintiff *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

The Court **ORDERS** any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within 14 days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action.

Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the report, proposed



findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court **DIRECTS** the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Plaintiff.

**SO ORDERED** and **REPORTED and RECOMMENDED**, this 28th day of January, 2019.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'B. Cheesbro', is positioned above a horizontal line.

BENJAMIN W. CHEESBRO  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA